The Schlieffen Plan Essays - France, Military Plans,

The Schlieffen Plan In 1905, General Alfred von Schlieffen, who at that time was the Chief of the General Staff of Germany, developed a plan for war in Europe. He developed the plan in an attempt to prepare for the inevitable, a two front war with France and Russia. When he developed the plan he took in account all aspects of the many events that were occurring during that time. "Unfortunately, the plan would involve a violation of the International Agreement, signed by the Great Powers in 1839, guaranteeing Belgium's permanent neutrality." Schlieffen believed that France would attempt to recover Alsace-Lorraine. He planned to draw the French into a major offensive battle in Alsace. While France's attention was turned to that part of the country, 90% of the German Army would storm through Belgium and the Netherlands toward the South of Paris in a sweeping movement. This would allow the German forces to travel through the borders of Belgium, Netherlands, and the surrounding country side toward the South Paris, entrapping the French Army between the two German forces. This would allow Germany to attack the French army from their weaker point in the rear. With the French Army engaged in war with the other 10% of the German Army, the French would not notice the Germans coming from the rear. The Germans coming form the rear would push the French forward, trapping them between the two German forces. William the Second, the Emperor of Germany, replaced General Schlieffen with Helmuth von Moltke, as the Chief of the General Sta ff of Germany in 1906. Moltke modified the Schlieffen Plan from the original version. The Schlieffen Plan was a very engenus plan. The plan was devised for the German troops to be dispersed as follows: 1) 11 corps and 7 Reserve corps South of Namur 2) 6 corps and 1/2 Reserve corps through Mezieres 3) 8 corps and 5 Reserve corps through Verdun and Metz 4) 3 corps and 1 Reserve corps through Strasbourg This left no Reserves left to protect the countryside of Germany. Schlieffen had expected the German Army to be at least 41 1/2 Corp of troops by the time war would break out with France and Russia. He was counting on something that would not take place before war would break out. Moltke modified Schlieffen's Plan for a reason. The reason being that he believed that Germany did not have the man power for effective protection against invading countries. Moltke altered Schlieffen's plan in 1914, as follows: 1) 8 corps and 5 Reserve corps South of Namur 2) 6 corps and 3 Reserve corps through Mezieres 3) 3 corps and 2 Reserve corps through Verdum and Metz 4) 4 corps and 1 Reserve Corp through Strasbourg 5) 2 corps and 1 Reserve Corp in Reserve. In the revised Schlieffen Plan, Moltke would abandon the territory of Alsace-Lorraine if the Italian government did not show up to help. The Italian Chief of Staff, General Pollio, had promised that his Italian troops would help the Germans. Until his death in 1914, General Pollio had assured Moltke the Italian Army would occupy Alsace-Lorraine. Moltke felt that it was necessary to hold that Province with the two corps. If the Italians did not appear then the question would arise how would the German Army get to Alsace-Lorraine in time to defend the region. The French attack was directed toward Mulhausen, which delayed German troops transport to the right wing of the attack. As the Schlieffen plan was drawn up, Russia was still in a weakened state due to the Manchurian War. Russia was still behind the times of regular army operations. They had man power no question about it. However, man power does not make an army great, the leaders and the common sense of the Delegation make the ar my great. If the Russian Army had sufficient resources, the German Army would have not only had to fight the French, they would have also had to fight on the Russian border. This would have made the Schlieffen Plan just a passing thought because there would have not been enough German troops to carry it through. Russia would have needed the weaponry and a decent mean by which to deploy their troops with the right amount of equipment to